"Always recognize that human individuals are ends, and do not use them as mere means to your ends." - Kant
Lance:
Couldn't be a more wrong orientation. Economic value of a person is the most dependable and closest to truth valuation we have, and equal valuation of all people is the furthest from truth we have. The Kant quote, along with some Rousseau quotes I'm sure, fuel the absurd social justice equality frameworks that have plagued the modern era. For example we should send more wealth and safety to the engineer in Tokyo than the peasant villager in Vietnam. While on that example, the anti-war peace movement of the late 60s that so valued those peasants in Vietnam....was a case of mass stupidity. It was then that the Left broke from technological progress as "progress" and began to lean in hard on the value of all lives and species over human innovation. The Left has been "the problem" ever since.
Richard:
From the perspective of Kant’s moral philosophy, this argument is fundamentally flawed because it treats human worth as contingent upon economic value rather than intrinsic dignity. Kant’s ethical framework, particularly his concept of the categorical imperative, asserts that every rational being possesses inherent worth and must be treated as an end in themselves, not merely as a means to an end.
Your claim that "economic value of a person is the most dependable and closest to truth valuation" contradicts Kant’s idea that moral worth is not based on utility, productivity, or wealth. For Kant, human dignity arises from our ability to act according to moral law, not from our market value. This is why Kant would reject the idea that an engineer in Tokyo is morally more deserving of wealth and safety than a peasant in Vietnam—such a valuation relies on instrumental reasoning, which treats people as means rather than ends.
Moreover, your critique of the "anti-war peace movement" and "the Left" for valuing all human lives equally would also be problematic from a Kantian standpoint. Kant advocated for universal moral principles, which include valuing every human life equally in moral considerations, regardless of nationality, economic status, or role in technological progress. The idea that some lives should be prioritized over others based on economic contribution is a consequentialist argument, not a deontological one—and Kant firmly rejected consequentialism.
In short, Kant’s moral philosophy stands in direct opposition to your argument. He would argue that your framework reduces human worth to material conditions, which is exactly the kind of thinking that his moral philosophy was designed to refute.
Lance:
Humans exist within "material conditions". For secular thought this is especially fundamental. To be both secular and hold this anti-material valuation scheme is to be up to something nonsensical and if one truly pursues this in the real world the outcome will be perverse and miserable across the whole culture in which it spread. And we have so much in the last 200 years as examples of this perversity and misery. It is not Lance versus Kant, reality in the historical record slays this Kantian platitude.
Richard:
You’re making a category error between moral philosophy and historical materialism. Yes, humans exist within material conditions, but that doesn’t mean moral worth should be measured by economic value. Kant’s argument isn’t about denying economic realities—it’s about setting a normative principle that people should be treated as ends, not just means.
Being secular doesn’t require adopting a purely materialist valuation. Human dignity, rights, and justice aren’t strictly economic constructs, yet they shape law, ethics, and policy worldwide. Calling Kant’s principle a “platitude” ignores how deeply it has influenced real-world institutions, from human rights to constitutional law.
And if we’re using history as proof, let’s be clear: materialist systems have caused just as much suffering—whether through slavery, colonialism, or unregulated capitalism. Societies that recognize universal dignity tend to be freer, more stable, and more just. If you want to argue that human worth is purely economic, then you’re also arguing that the rich are inherently more valuable than the poor—which is exactly the kind of thinking that led to some of history’s worst atrocities. Reality doesn’t “slay” Kant—it actually vindicates him.
Lance:
The humans clustered around innovation receive the benefits of higher living standards. By higher living standards I mean very real wealth, health, and safety. The backward receive less of these, regardless of their personal character. This is perfect justice.
Richard:
Sure, innovation clusters lead to higher living standards—no argument there. But calling the resulting inequality "perfect justice" is where you go from observation to moral assertion without justification. You're essentially saying, “The people who end up with more deserve it, and those with less deserve that too, regardless of personal character.” That’s not justice—that’s just the status quo with a moral stamp of approval.
If your standard for justice is purely outcome-based (whoever gets more, deserves more), then you'd have to argue that every historical power imbalance—slavery, colonialism, feudalism—was also “perfect justice” just because one group ended up better off. That’s straight-up might-makes-right thinking, and it contradicts your supposed commitment to materialist realism. Justice isn’t just “who gets more stuff.” Otherwise, you'd have to admit that if innovation shifted elsewhere, your entire moral framework collapses. What happens if the “backward” overtake the “innovators” due to factors outside of individual merit—like geopolitical shifts or resource exploitation? By your own reasoning, you’d have to suddenly agree that they deserve everything and the former “innovators” deserve nothing. That’s not a moral principle—it’s just cheerleading for whoever is winning at the moment.
So which is it—are you making a materialist observation (which is fair) or trying to force a moral conclusion that doesn’t hold up? Because if it’s the latter, you’ve just argued for a world where power alone defines justice—which means you’d better be ready to accept any outcome as “just” as long as it’s the result of material conditions.
Lance:
I'm cheerleading for whoever is winning at the moment. And by winning I remind you the innovation(s) are the sum of a lot of factors, it is not a brute force kind of victory, it is not "brutish". Outcomes are the best moral assertions.
You are set to a default "power imbalances are inherently evil". From out of nowhere ( oh wait, all teachings of your era ) you get this a priori moral axis with a fixed positive side. I say power imbalances are only wrong when the result is a brutish backward society. Such as the Ottoman Empire or the colonial Spanish Empire. Note all these become the poorer dumber counter to an innovating Dutch or England, and then another power imbalance happens that is worth cheering for, the colonialism of the Dutch and the English.
The colonialism of the Hellenistic Greeks was a virtuous effect on that part of the world. It deleted dynastic Egypt from existence, making it a foreign occupied culture for at least 2000 years. This was all a positive.
Richard:
Kant’s quote is about human dignity—people should be treated as ends in themselves, not just as tools for others' goals. This means human worth isn’t based on wealth, status, or usefulness, but on being rational, autonomous beings. Using others purely for economic output or power contradicts this principle. Mutual benefit is fine, but exploitation isn’t. Kant’s philosophy is the foundation of human rights and modern ethics, rejecting the idea that some people are inherently worth more just because they produce more.
Lance:
Exploitation is not universally wrong. Universal equality certainly is wrong.
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